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Executive summary 
The privatisation of the Nigerian electricity sector was a much-anticipated reform exercise. 
Launched in 2010, the exercise was intended to modernise the sector and cater to the 
country’s growing demand for electricity. However, a decade on, the desired outcomes have 
still not materialised and the electricity available on the national grid to light homes and power 
the economy has stayed at an almost constant 4,500 megawatts (MW), well below the 8,400 
MW projected for 2018. One reason for this is the technical inefficiency of the grid, beginning 
with inefficient gas supplies, the inability of the transmission system to deploy adequate 
electricity, and poor collection of user tariffs by distribution companies. Revenue shortfalls 
have resulted in extensive government bailouts.  
Such inefficiencies in the sector are compounded by ‘legacy’ corruption that has led to poor 
maintenance of the transmission network during state-ownership and to the presence of 
politically connected bidders in the recent privatisation efforts. The design of contracts and 
lack of regulatory oversight has further deterred credible and technically competent investors 
during the bidding process. The politically connected nature of many of the acquisitions also 
mean the government is reluctant to take any tough decisions with regard to the sector. 
The conditions in which consumers lack supply and firms are unable to make profits have 
given rise to a host of interdependent corruption mechanisms. As the sector moves deeper 
into loss, the space for formal earnings becomes narrower, and the perverse incentives to be 
corrupt deepens. This has now pushed the sector into a state of low-level equilibrium, with 
significant restructuring needed in order to turn things around. 
Our analysis of the political settlement in the sector suggests anti-corruption-related solutions 
for Nigeria’s power sector should follow a two-track approach – one for the short-to-medium 
term, and one for the long term. The latter strategy includes capital investment and debt 
restructuring but this is not going to be easy to achieve. The medium-term strategy is focused 
on the most vulnerable segment of Nigeria’s economy, namely small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). 
Inclusive, diversified growth in the country depends on growth of the SME sector. Hence, the 
short-to-medium-term solution must focus on easing power-supply constraints for this sector 
in particular. Our research recommends a disaggregated, embedded power-generating 
solution using natural gas as feedstock for existing SME clusters whose chief constraint to 
achieving competitiveness is inadequate electricity supply.  SMEs should be incentivised to 
support the recommended strategy, however solutions must be developed with local political-
economy considerations in mind, not only in a technocratic manner. 
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1. Introduction 
The programme to privatise Nigeria’s power sector was one of the most ambitious market 
reforms attempted in Africa. The process began with the Electric Power Sector Reform Act of 
2005, but bids to take over utilities in the sector were only formally launched in 2012. Policy-
makers in the country were hoping to emulate the success of the privatisation exercise in 
the telecommunication sector that took place in 2001. Along with increasing power 
generation, they were also hoping to reduce corruption by making the sector more 
transparent and compliant and by breaking up the government’s monopoly.  
In the years since 2012, rated or installed capacity increased from 9,900 megawatts (MW) to 
12,522 MW in 2015 (Advisory Power Team, 2015). However, average generation in August 
2019 was just 3,578 MW (Asu, 2020) and hasn’t risen above 5,300 MW since the 
privatisation process began.  
More pressingly, a recent report by the French development agency Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD) highlights accumulated losses of Naira (N) 474 billion in the sector 
(cited by Nnodim, 2019). A similar report on the financial status of the sector states that the 
monthly shortfall between costs and income in the electricity value chain – which essentially 
includes the national grid covering generation, transmission and distribution – was N40 
billion a month in 2018 (SDN, 2018). Grid connectivity was not available to close to 55% of 
the country in 2015 (Advisory Power Team, 2015, although other sources provide higher 
figures). In Western Africa more is spent on the fuel for back up generation via distributed 
diesel and gasoline generators than on electricity from the grid—with Nigeria having the 
largest number of such generators in the region (IFC, 2019).  
At the same time, it is important to note that Nigeria has one of the highest levels of 
economic output in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) measured for every installed unit 
(watt) of power from grid-based generation (ibid.) This means the grid is pushed to capacity 
and is entirely unable to meet the demand for electricity in the productive sectors. It is clear 
that Nigeria’s power sector is unsustainable, which has repercussions for inclusive growth in 
Africa’s largest economy.  
In the light of this evidence, it is worthwhile analysing the reasons behind the disappointing 
performance in the power sector. The current crisis is a liquidity crisis as a result of deep 
structural distortions. A few interdependent issues stand out:  
 The design of contracts post-privatisation has led to adverse selection with only politically 
connected bidders participating in the process rather than technically competent ones. 
These bidders used Nigerian banks for financing, which have ended up assuming much of 
the systemic risk.  
 The financial health of the sector was based on tariffs and projections that could never be 
politically implemented. Projections for the performance of the sector were based on 
distribution and generation companies (which are not publicly listed) reinvesting in the 
sector to build technical capacity. Instead the companies started paying themselves 
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dividends from the first year of operations as well as paying off their loans to banks. 
Therefore, quality improvements did not take place and supply did not increase as much 
as projected. 
 The sector is technically inefficient owing to years of underinvestment in transmission 
infrastructure. The transmission sector wasn’t privatised in 2012 while the generation 
and distribution sectors were. One of the reasons for this underinvestment has been 
high levels of political corruption within the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), a 
state-owned utility, despite attempts to reform it (Ogunleye, 2016). As a result, even if 
Nigerian power stations were operating at full capacity, the transmission network would 
be able to ‘wheel’ or transmit no more than 7,000 MW due to ailing infrastructure. This 
is according to official statements. However, most industry analysts say actual wheeling 
capacity is no more than 3,000 to 4,000 MW.  
 New agencies have not been as effective post-privatisation and haven’t changed matters 
much within the sector. For instance, the Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trader (NBET) was 
meant to be a government-owned Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that pooled the 
electricity generated and acted as an institutional backstop. This agency was meant to 
inject confidence in the sector but is now facing liquidity challenges.  
 Distribution companies are unable to provide enough power to meet demand. 
Subsequently they cannot charge tariffs that are reflective of the costs incurred along 
the grid, so returns are very low in the sector and costs are high. This discourages 
genuine investors and leaves only politically connected ones who can hope to recoup 
their investments through distortionary means.  
We can describe the sector as being stuck in a low-level equilibrium where incentives to 
invest in and upgrade the grid are absent. 
In sectors where demand is high and supply is severely constrained, there are strong 
perverse incentives for corrupt behaviour. This is true of the power sector in Nigeria. 
Consumers – whether residential, commercial or industrial – frequently resort to stealing 
electricity from distribution lines (known as ‘tapping’). This is common practice across most 
developing countries and Nigeria is no exception. However, due to the failure of grid-based 
supply, Nigeria has one of the largest proportions of self-generation in the developing world, 
whereby generators and other means such as inverters are used to produce power. Indeed, 
over 80% of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) own or use a generator in Nigeria 
(Scott et al., 2014), and the easy availability of diesel diverted from official sources in the 
country means there is a thriving black market for fuel (SDN, 2018). This practice was 
exacerbated during the fuel shortage in 2017.  
The use of diesel sourced from the black market has obvious revenue implications for the 
formal economy. It also has significantly high social costs in terms of externalities linked to 
environmental pollution and health concerns, and even security in the Niger Delta. This 
results in cumulative causation that moves the sector further away from the desired 
outcome of higher social welfare. 
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Figure 1: Main sources of lighting in households not connected to the grid 
 
Source: World Bank (2018). 
Our analysis of the Nigerian power sector is based on the SOAS University of London Anti-
Corruption Evidence (ACE) framework that identifies the rents being allocated in the sector 
and their distortion, the beneficiaries associated with these rents, and the configuration of 
organisational power in the sector. This analysis suggests two reform trajectories, one over 
the short-to-medium term and the other over the long term.  
The first reform trajectory takes into account the seemingly intractable levels of corruption 
in the national grid, especially with regard to the historical operations of the TCN. This 
‘legacy’ corruption along with contractual uncertainty has ensured that credible investors 
are staying away. The electricity value chain is both highly interconnected between players 
and has high capital costs. In developing countries there is also an important element of 
cross subsidy in the sector between rural and urban consumers or industrial and residential 
consumers of electricity. As a result, operational risks are high in the absence of clear 
institutional mechanisms that signal financial stability and returns. Confidence in the sector 
requires a mechanism for contractual clarity that provides credible commitment, and this 
usually comes from the government. These conditions are as yet unfulfilled in the Nigerian 
electricity sector. This has led to such high levels of risk premia that credible investors are 
staying away.  
The above conditions point towards a short-to-medium-term strategy that entails looking for 
solutions outside the national grid via investors who are willing to explore off-grid and 
disaggregated generation solutions, or small generating units directly connected to a 
distribution system. Our research in the power sector has identified the SME sector in the 
country as having adequate willingness to pay for electricity through such an alternative 
network. SMEs account for 96% of businesses in Nigeria (PwC, n.d.) and, given the nature of 
their operations, they are most vulnerable to losses from lack of electricity supply. In a Nigeria 
Enterprise Survey from 2007, quoted by Scott et al. (2014), 75.9% of SMEs said lack of 
2% 
15% 
10% 
34% 
6% 
33% 
Candle Generator Rechargeble lamp Kerosene Firewood Battery
Breaking the cycle of corruption in Nigeria’s electricity sector: a political settlements analysis 
8 
electricity was a ‘major constraint’ for them. A reform policy focused on SMEs has the 
potential to be developmental in a manner that is both impactful and feasible. Helping SMEs 
achieve greater competitiveness has obvious benefits in terms of inclusive economic growth 
and for moving the economy away from oil and gas. It is also feasible, as our ACE strategy of 
incentive alignment (Khan et al., 2019) finds strong support from SMEs as well as from recent 
policy statements made by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) (see section 5). Research 
conducted with a sample of 40 SMEs in the manufacturing clusters of Nnewi, Onitsha and Aba, 
as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) where the capital Abuja is located, has provided 
further evidence to support this strategy, as have interviews with 15 key informants with close 
and intensive knowledge of the sector and the privatisation process.    
The second reform trajectory entails a long-term strategy of financial restructuring of the 
national grid to reduce risks so it becomes viable and can expand. Our analysis of the 
political settlement of the sector suggests it will be difficult to enforce policies that will 
enable financing to flow through the grid more fluidly or to resolve the political corruption in 
the sector in the short-to-medium term. However, a disaggregated solution cannot be a 
permanent one for Nigeria. The country reports one of the lowest consumptions of 
electricity per capita in Africa (see Table 1 for selected African countries) and, at a macro 
level, achieving structural transformation requires a stable and efficient grid that can supply 
the productive sectors. While there have been some successes post-privatisation – like the 
addition of some new grid capacity, the push towards renewables, a clear policy roadmap 
for off-grid solutions and fulfilment of the country’s electricity export obligations to Benin 
and Togo – this is clearly not enough for the Nigerian economy as the figures below suggest. 
Table 1: Per capita electricity consumption in selected African countries 
Nigeria Ghana Côte d’Ivoire Angola Kenya South Africa 
145kWh 351kWh 275kWh 312kWh 164kWh 4198kWh 
Notes: Per capita electricity consumption calculated as power distributed (kilowatts, KW) x 24 x 365/total population. kWh = kilowatt 
hours. 
Source: World Bank (2014a). 
Table 2: Percentage of grid-connected households in selected African countries  
Nigeria Ghana Cote d’Ivoire Senegal Sierra Leone South Africa 
0–33% 34–74% 34–74% 34–74% 0–33% 75–80% 
Note: Due to variation in populations among the countries, percentage of households connected to grid is preferred to number of 
households. 
Source: Afrobarometer data 2014/15 in Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies (2019). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the ACE 
approach to anti-corruption that informs our analysis of the power sector in Nigeria. Section 
3 describes privatisation efforts in the country and the corruption in the power sector 
identified by our research, while Section 4 presents the losses incurred by the sector. Section 
5 sets out the proposed ACE approach for the sector and the evidence that we have 
generated to support this strategy. We also deliberate in Section 5 on some additional 
institutional arrangements linked to our proposed solution and recommendations for future 
reform. We conclude briefly in Section 6.  
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2. Interdependencies and the 
analysis of corruption: the ACE 
approach 
One of the many reasons why anti-corruption reforms fail is because they tend to overlook 
the many interdependencies that exist in the relevant sector.  
The first interdependency exists between the micro and the macro levels. The micro level 
includes corruption driven by greed and the discretion of individual public officials. Most 
standard anti-corruption efforts based on enforcement are aimed at this level. However, this 
corruption is embedded in the macro systemic level that comprises the social and political 
order within a country (Khan et al., 2019). The second interdependency is the interaction 
between anti-corruption policies that target specific distortions and other wider policy 
interventions already in place (Johnsøn et al., 2012; DFID, 2015).  
The third crucial interdependence that needs to be addressed is the relevance of a policy 
within a particular distribution of power, or the political settlement within a country or 
context. A political settlement is a specific configuration of the distribution of power and the 
distribution of benefits (or policies) (Khan 2010, 2012b, 2018). For instance, privatisation in 
Nigeria was meant to make the power sector more efficient by introducing competition and 
transparency and thereby reducing the discretion of government officials, especially in the 
distribution sub-sector. However, this did little to address corruption in other parts of the 
grid. Indeed, there are reports of petty corruption even in the privatised distribution sector 
with regard to billing and metering. Privatisation in Nigeria was modelled on two Indian 
examples, but the models chosen were not compatible with the political settlement of the 
Nigerian power sector (SDN, 2018). One distribution model was from the Indian state of 
Odisha and this was deemed unsuccessful even in the Indian context (Sioshansi, 506, 2013).  
The main utility, the Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (PHCN), had an installed capacity 
of 6199.2 MW at the time of privatisation. It was also the only utility authorised to generate, 
transmit and distribute. In India, privatisation happened within a very different configuration 
of organisational power. Here, privatisation was spurred by the fact that the State Electricity 
Boards (SEBs) – the agencies charged with coordinating generation, transmission and 
distribution in each Indian state – were in deep financial crisis due to mismanagement and 
rent-seeking. Many SEBs defaulted on payments to the central government for coal which is 
the fuel most commonly used in India for power generation. This motivated the central 
government to bring in private investment (Kale, 2004). The major public-sector generator 
was the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), a near monopoly, which is still the 
single largest producer of India’s electricity, contributing about 25% of power generated 
with an installed capacity of 57,356 MW. Privatising such a huge corporation would have 
been difficult but NTPC was also profitable, and paradoxically this made it politically difficult 
to sell off. The emerging private sector within power generation therefore operated next to 
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a large and profitable public sector that set the yardstick for performance. It also 
constrained the power of private companies to negotiate informal deals that would let them 
get away with inefficient performance. Subsequently, the enforcement costs for policy in the 
sector were lower in India than in Nigeria. 
Due to historical reasons, the manufacturing sector in India was also more developed than in 
Nigeria, with powerful interests demanding electricity at reasonable prices. Industry set up 
its own huge Captive Power Plant (CPP) programme and after privatisation these were also 
allowed to feed into grids (Tongia, 2003). CPPs with a generation capacity above 1 MW 
currently have an installed capacity of over 40,000 MW. The CPP cluster put pressure on 
public-sector generators and distributors in terms of pricing, particularly if they attempted to 
expropriate too much from business interests. In the industrially advanced western state of 
Gujarat, clusters of SMEs also contested the state electricity board which was passing on 
suspiciously high prices to them (Hansen and Bower, 2003). Such horizontal checks and 
balances across different types of organisations were only possible because there was a 
broader and more diversified base of productive capabilities in both the private and public 
sectors in India. Finally, the private-sector firms that went into generation were politically 
connected in India but also had high enough technical capabilities to be able to generate 
electricity efficiently when under pressure to do so. 
Although the Indian public and private players were no less willing to engage in informal 
modifications of their contracts and prices than in Nigeria, they were constrained by a 
different distribution of organisational power that enabled more productive outcomes. In 
both countries, formal institutions were informally modified, but in different ways – 
modifications vary in different contexts and are connected to how power is distributed as 
well as the relative power between political and economic organisations. This is why a set of 
reforms may work in one context but do not work in another. 
While the Nigerian power sector required extensive reform, the outcome of privatisation 
suggests the set of policies intended to drive it were in the main not appropriate for the 
prevailing institutional conditions. One broader lesson from privatisation in developing 
countries not limited to Nigeria is that corruption seems to remain entrenched despite 
reforms introducing a formal structure of competition and freer markets (Van de Walle, 
2006; Fritz and Menocal, 2007). This is because the distribution of benefits remains narrow 
when politically connected bidders are in the fray and existing extractive interests are 
further entrenched with privatisation. During privatisation in Nigeria, the productive 
capabilities of the firms were low, with most lacking much or any experience in the sector.  
Anti-corruption strategies like privatisation reforms often fail in developing countries 
because they typically assume corrupt acts are deviations from a rule of law driven more by 
the discretion of government officials at the micro level. If that were so, improvements in 
transparency and accountability would be effective and that would be all the policies 
needed. In contrast, developing countries have high levels of informality and ‘rule by law’ – 
many institutions and laws are enforced, but often not on the powerful and that includes 
players in the private sector. Enforcement is therefore selective and most often not impartial 
(Khan, 2010, 2018). Most powerful and politically connected private-sector players break the 
rules in order to accumulate wealth and assets, and it is therefore not in their interests to be 
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rule-following. In other words, the incentive structure to be rule-following does not exist. 
The brief comparison with India also demonstrates how similar policies have different 
outcomes owing to variations in configurations of organisational power. 
The challenge is to create conditions where incentives can be restructured such that agents 
will no longer resort to corruption in their self-interest. Any policy also has to be self-
enforcing in order for it to be sustainable. This requires mapping the relevant political 
settlement, which includes identifying the powerful organisations and the rents that drive 
activity in the sector. It also requires identifying the types of corruption in order to target 
anti-corruption policy effectively. Cross-country evidence has shown that some rents can 
lead to developmental social outcomes (Stiglitz, 1996; Khan, 2006, 2009; Meisel and Ould 
Aoudia, 2007; North et al., 2009; DiJohn, 2011; Booth, 2012). Equally, informal networks of 
patron–client politics can be damaging for growth (Hodges, 2004; Rocha Menocal, 2005; 
Khan, 2006, 2010, 2012a; Roy, 2012). It is therefore imperative to recognise the outcomes of 
the rent-seeking process as a net effect rather than just through the rent-seeking costs 
(Khan, 2009). 
It is useful to identify types of corruption as established in Khan (2006, 2009) and Khan et al. 
(2019) as these can help to identify policies that can be feasible as well as likely to have high 
impact. The two-step method outlined earlier that uses the political-settlements approach 
and identifies the key rents in the sector has helped us suggest policy combinations that 
target constituencies in the power sector who are likely to support the attempted reform. 
Identifying the different kinds of corruption, whether market-restricting, policy-distorting, 
political or predatory, can help us provide a general assessment of the right mix of feasible 
and high-impact reforms that can provide a developmental outcome (Khan, 2006; Khan et 
al., 2019). And interdependencies matter here too. The same sector can have multiple 
players subject to many different policies. Large politically connected firms in Nigeria were 
able to distort potentially useful policies using their political connections in a manner that 
left the power sector deeply entrenched in debt and unable to function. For instance, the 
initial guidelines for privatisation stated that local entities could bid without having a 
technical background as long as they had international partners who were technically 
competent. In many cases, local entities with no background in the sector bid in partnership 
with technically competent international companies, but the latter’s equity participation 
remained too low to be decisive. This sort of corruption has mixed characteristics of both 
policy distortion and political corruption.  
At the same time, both the end customers and distributing companies were often accusing 
each other of either not paying their bills or of overcharging, respectively. One policy that 
remains deeply contested is that of ‘estimated billing’ where bills are not based on meter 
usage but where commercial losses are passed on to customers (Adeniyi, 2019). This was 
initially allowed as most connections in Nigeria were not metered and distribution 
companies needed some metric. However, post-privatisation, there were reports of 
distribution companies misusing this policy to over-charge. Equally, there were reports that 
customers who received the right estimate refused to pay as there was no proof of their 
usage. In other cases, users ‘settled’ with officials from distribution companies at a rate 
much less than billed. This can be characterised as market restriction-driven corruption as 
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distortion by companies and evasion by customers is due to a policy that cannot be 
enforced. And nor is the underlying rent from this policy broadly socially useful.  
We also make a careful distinction between rules that are violated for different reasons. For 
instance, we need to distinguish between those who are violating rules because they have 
no option and those who are violating deliberately in order to cheat. We therefore have to 
identify strategies that may enable some productive insiders, in our case SME owners in 
existing clusters, to become more rule-following and support the enforcement of socially 
desirable rules in their own interest at least at the level of specific activities and sectors. This 
is where we deploy SOAS ACE’s bottom-up strategies and strategy clusters to identify 
possible solutions (Khan et al., 2019). The key here is to design policies that are self-
sustaining in order to ensure compliance and enforcement. Vertical or top-down policies 
that rely only on external (to the level of the relevant sector) enforcement are unlikely to be 
successful and this is where policy solutions have to identify opportunities for horizontal 
buy-in, that is, where interested actors follow rules in their own benefit. Horizontal 
enforcement is therefore needed in order to nudge behaviour to move in more rule-
following directions.  
The anti-corruption strategy set out in this paper is based on a close reading of the above 
analysis. 
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3. The privatisation process, rent 
capture and the power sector 
The privatisation of public enterprises in Nigeria can be traced to 1988 following the 
promulgation of the Privatization and Commercialization Decree No. 25 of 1988. However, 
the privatisation exercise was only given impetus by the enactment of the Privatization Act 
No. 28 of 1999. Subsequently, the National Council on Privatization was inaugurated and the 
Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) was established to provide the legal, methodological and 
institutional framework for the privatisation programme. Reform and privatisation of the 
power sector specifically started in 2000 with the formation of the Electric Power 
Implementation Committee (EPIC), which prepared the National Electric Power Policy (NEPP) 
in 2001 and the Electric Power Sector Reform (EPSR) Act in 2005. These provided the legal 
backing for power-sector reform. Specifically, the NEPP provided a legal framework for 
commercialisation and liberalisation of the electricity industry in Nigeria following the return 
to civil rule in 1999. It attempted to bring an end to public-sector monopoly in the area of 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution by allowing private participation.  
Essentially, the reform had two components – restructuring and privatisation. The reform 
package set out to change the structure of the industry in order to stimulate competition 
and promote financial accountability. The decision taken was to unbundle the sector into its 
constituent parts (generation, distribution and transmission), to establish commercial 
trading arrangements (of electricity), and finally, to change the control and ownership of the 
National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). In line with the goals of the power-sector reform, 
NEPA was incorporated as the Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (PHCN) by the BPE with 
the support of donor agencies in 2005. Following the successful incorporation, all the 
functions, assets, liabilities and staff of NEPA were transferred to PHCN. The PHCN was 
further unbundled into 6 generating, 11 distribution and 1 transmission organisations. The 
Nigeria Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was established as an independent 
regulator. A Canadian company called Manitoba was chosen through a bidding process to 
manage the grid, but its contract expired in 2016 and wasn’t renewed leading to questions 
as to why this was allowed to happen (SDN, 2018). TCN and NBET were left as the only 
players in the transmission sector. 
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Table 3: Power generation in Nigeria 
Generator name 
  
Fuel type 
  
Theoretical  
capacity 
  
Capacity 
available 
  
Average capacity generating (MW) 
2013 2014 2015 2017  
First quarter 
PHCN successor Gencos           
EGBIN GAS 1320 1030 604 473 584 580 
AFAM IV-V GAS 600 178 38 25 1 60 
SAPELE GAS 1020 135 46 47 64 39 
TRANSCORP POWER GAS 972 373 188 319 322 353 
GEREGUI GAS 414 284 113 102 124 71 
OMOTOSHO GAS 335 168 60 104 166 97 
OLORUNSOGO GAS 335 168 57 129 175 88 
SHIRORO HYDRO 600 565 283 223 207 256 
JEBBA HYDRO 570 570 303 285 232 219 
KAINJI HYDRO 760 199 100 67 199 196 
SUB-TOTAL   6,926.00  3,670.00  1,792.00  1,774.00  2,074.00  1,959.00  
OPERATIONAL NIPPS               
ALAOJI NIPP GAS 1074 497 3 1 86 121 
OLORUNSOGO NIPP GAS 675 462 100 127 131 6 
SAPELE NIPP GAS 450 249 136 95 104 85 
IHOVBOR NIPP GAS 450 360 71 175 129 84 
GEREGU II (NIPP) GAS 434 434 102 127 133 130 
OMOTOSHO NIPP GAS 450 268 195 130 149 125 
OMOKU GAS 250 120 0 0 0 13 
GBARAIN GAS 225 113 0 0 0 60 
ODUKPANI NIPP (Calabar) GAS 561 120 0 0 35 53 
SUB-TOTAL   4,569.00  2,623.00  607.00  655.00  767.00  677.00  
IPPs (on-grid)               
IBOM POWER GAS 190 170 4 47 55 120 
AES GAS 270 250 152 41 0 0 
AGIP (OKPAI) GAS 450 450 320 360 302 355 
SHELL GAS 650 650 366 391 346 385 
TRANS-AMADI GAS 60 0 0 0 0 60 
SUB-TOTAL   1,620.00  1,520.00  842.00  839.00  703.00  920.00  
ON-GRID TOTAL   13,115.00  7,813.00  3,241.00  3,268.00  3,544.00  3,556.00  
                
IPPs (off-grid)               
OMOKO UPP GAS 150 150 78 53 0 23 
TRANS-AMADI GAS 60 24 1 0 0 0 
GEOMETRIC POWER (ABA) GAS 132 0 0 0 0 0 
NESCO (Jos) - Island HYDRO 30 21 24 24 18 12 
                
OFF-GRID TOTAL   372 195 103 77 18 35 
Note: The big capacity addition since 2017 Q1 has been the 461 MW Azura plant in Edo state which has a proposed capacity of 1,500 MW. 
Source: SDN (2018: 23, Table 3). 
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The NBET – known as the ‘bulk trader’ or aggregator of power – was incorporated on 29 July 
2010 as the SPV for carrying out, under license from NERC, the bulk purchase of generated 
power from the generating companies (GenCos) and its resale to the distribution companies 
(DisCos). In August 2010, the federal government released its Road map for power sector 
reform (FGN, 2010), which outlined the following stages for privatisation of the unbundled 
PHCN: 
 Submission of bids: July 2012  
 National Council on Privatization approval of bids: October 2012  
 Completion of negotiations: January 2013  
 Completion of industry agreements: February 2013  
 Payment of 25% share sale purchase: March 2013  
 Payment of 75% share sale purchase: August 2013  
With the successful completion of the basic requirements for transfer of ownership, the 
federal government handed over the 11 DisCos and 6 GenCos to private investors on 1 
November 2013. The GenCos were sold for $1.269 billion while the DisCos were sold for 
$1.256 billion.  
The breakdown of the preferred bidders for the DisCos, as IseOlorunkanmi (2014) reiterated 
based  on data from the National Council of Privatization, is as follows: Kann Consortium 
won Abuja Distribution Company at $164 million; Vigeo Power Consortium for Benin at $129 
million; West Power & Gas for Eko at $135 million; Interstate Electrics Limited for Enugu at 
$126 million; Integrated Energy for Ibadan at $169 million; NEDC/ KEPCO for Ikeja at $131 
million; Aura Energy Limited for Jos at $82 million; Sahelian Power SPV Limited for Kano at 
$137 million; 4Power Consortium for Port Harcourt at $124 million; and Integrated Energy 
Distribution and Marketing for Yola at $59 million.  
IseOlorunkanmi (2014) further noted that for the GenCos, the preferred bidders included 
Amperion for the Geregu Plant at $132 million; Mainstream for the Kainji Plant at $50.76 
million with a commencement fee of $237,870; North-South for Shiroro Plant at $23.6 
million with a commencement fee of $111 million; Transcorp/Woodwork for Ughelli Plant at 
$300 million; and CMEC/Eurafric for Sapele Plant at $201 million.  
However, despite the successful privatisation of the DisCos and GenCos, Amadi (2017) 
contends that the privatisation was problematic because it occurred before the regulatory 
framework for the new electricity market was fully established. This had severe implications 
for efficient service delivery in the power sector after privatisation, as we see in the next 
section. Figure 2 illustrates that power generation hasn’t improved since 2015. 
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Figure 2: Average generation in Nigeria post-privatisation 
 
Source: Nextier Power Advisory from NERC (unpublished data) 
3.1. Technical shortcomings 
According to a member of the senior management of NERC during the period of 
privatisation, the country was far from ready for the privatisation model that was chosen for 
Nigeria. The first among many problems was that the power sector had not received 
significant investment for decades. This led to high levels of technical inefficiency and there 
were regular instances of system collapse. There were also, in his view, ‘political variables’ to 
consider. Secondly, there should have been a transition from government control to 
commercialisation before taking the plunge to privatise, so that stakeholders could 
understand that electricity could be traded in a market structure. In other words, the three 
different parts of the electricity value chain – or the national grid – of generation, 
transmission and distribution should have been restructured in a manner that allowed them 
to operate at a profit and improve management systems before being turned over to the 
private sector. This has some parallels with the Indian experience outlined earlier. Thirdly, 
and even more seriously, there was no electricity to sell. The project document had 
recommended that electricity supply should be at least 18,000 MW before privatisation so 
that there would be a real market to sell in. However, supply was between 3,000 to 4,000 
MW when the industry was privatised. New generating plants had been built but had no gas 
supply, so they added nothing to electricity generation. The fourth challenge our key 
informant recounted was that when the request for proposals (RFP) went out, there were no 
competent firms in Nigeria with the capacity to deliver so the standards set in the guidelines 
were lowered to allow the privatisation process to proceed. This lack of ‘fit and proper 
investors’, he argued, was the fatal blow that led to the complete failure of the exercise. Our 
key informant concluded that there was no economic or commercial basis for the 
privatisation given the poor quality of infrastructure.  
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Table 4 shows how Nigeria lags behind South Africa, Botswana and Kenya in terms of 
transmission infrastructure. These three countries have higher transmission voltages, and 
this translates into lower system losses. 
Table 4: Comparison of transmission infrastructure (high voltage transmission lines)  
Nigeria South Africa Ghana Botswana Kenya 
Voltage transmission 
lines: 330kV, 132kV and 
33kV 
Main transmission lines: 
132kv, 275kv, 400kv, 
and 765kv 
Three main voltage 
transmission lines:  
69 kV, 161 kV and 330 
kV 
Main voltage 
transmission lines: 33kv, 
132kv, 220kv, 330kv, 
and 400kv 
Main voltage 
transmission lines: 
132kv, 220kv, 400kv, 
and 500kv 
Sources: Ketraco (n.d.); Nigerian Finder (n.d.); Global Transmission Report (2018); Republic of Ghana (2019).  
According to another industry player closely connected to the privatisation reforms, the 
technical work for privatisation was simply not taken seriously. The level of electricity loss in 
the system was too high – 47% to 11% transmission losses, 14% distribution losses due to 
poor wiring, and 22% non-technical losses due to electricity theft. The FGN should have 
invested to address these problems before proceeding with the privatisation, he argued. The 
other problem, according to him, was that all the investors took commercial bank loans to 
finance their acquisitions at very high interest rates and were therefore burdened with bank 
loans they were unable to service. This also meant that the firms became overleveraged and 
unable to borrow more for additional investments in the sector. Expert opinion is that the 
investors should have been allowed recourse to long-term development financing. However, 
given that most of them did not have the technical and managerial qualifications to bid as 
electricity companies, it is highly unlikely that they would have passed the due diligence 
requirements for access to development finance. 
The chief executive officer of one of the largest DisCos from the North Central region, and 
one of our key informants, confirms the financial difficulties they ran into. He said they took 
a bank loan at a rate of 18.75% to raise the funds of $82 million to buy the company. There 
was a gap of 11 months between when they paid and when they took over the business, 
while in the meantime bank charges were running from the first day they took the loan. This 
means that they had already accumulated unserviceable bank charges from the day they 
started running the DisCo. He added that the government reneged on their promise to allow 
a commercial tariff (though that remains politically difficult across developing countries and 
Nigeria is no exception). The DisCos also did not know that the losses in the industry were 
much higher than disclosed in the bidding documents – closer to 60% than the projected 
40%. In addition, government and security agencies simply refused to pay their power bills 
and there are no legal means to force payment so huge unpaid bills crippled the financial 
status of the companies. Our key informant also explained that the generating companies 
were not providing them enough electricity to sell. He argued that the distributing 
companies suffer the most, because government provision of an intervention fund has been 
unhelpful for them. This is because the Central Bank pays the money directly to the 
generating companies and the accounts of the distributing companies are debited for funds 
that have not come to them, thereby worsening their debt levels with their bankers.   
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The DisCos have openly admitted that their companies are not viable. The Punch newspaper 
reported that: ‘In a joint press conference organised by the 11 companies, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Jos DisCo, Tukur Modibbo, announced that they were ready to give 
up their licence if the federal government could refund the money invested in the utility. He 
said: “We bought Jos DisCo for $82 million. We are ready to give it away for $72 million if we 
see buyers now. If government refunds the investors their money, we will quit the 
business.”’ At the same meeting, John Ayodele, the Chief Operating Officer of Ibadan 
Electricity Distribution Company, said the DisCos they were sold were a product of unknown 
value. ‘We could not embark on physical due diligence of the privatised power entities 
before taking over the assets. There was no accurate technical, physical due diligence on 
what DisCos bought’ (Punch, 2018). 
3.2. Overlapping corruption in the sector post-privatisation 
It is useful to break down the various interdependent processes of corruption in the Nigerian 
power sector. In Nigeria, the 6 privatised generation plants and the 11 distribution 
companies were acquired by politically connected businessmen. In at least a few cases the 
GenCos and DisCos were owned by the same politically connected investor. For instance, 
Integrated Energy – which acquired the Ibadan and Yola DisCos – was promoted by General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar, a former military head of state. Colonel Sani Bello, who is the 
chairman of Mainstream Energy, the company that acquired the Kainji and Jebba hydel 
power plants, is a former military administrator of Kano state. Yusuf Hamisu Abubakar, the 
managing director of Sahelian Power that bought Kano Electricity Distribution Company, was 
a commissioner at the Nigerian Communications Commission, the government agency 
regulating the telecom sector. 
As outlined in Section 2, rent capture and corruption are almost always the outcome of 
interdependent institutions and organisations. In a sector like electricity, where sunk costs 
are high, policy capture is a likely outcome. Equally, in a supply constrained sector with very 
high demand, off-market and corrupt transactions will emerge to cater to demand and to 
capture rents. In the Nigerian case, the issue is compounded as, first, TCN is widely regarded 
as being subject to political capture (Ogunleye, 2016; Papaefstratiou, 2019) and, second, the 
companies involved in the privatisation process had strong political connections rather than 
strong technical capabilities. The presence of technically qualified partner companies was 
marginal (Energy Mix Report, n.d.). The privatisation process was such (no permission for 
bidding companies to conduct due diligence, lack of sovereign guarantees, etc.) that it was 
not attractive for genuine private investors, especially technically capable international ones. 
This led to adverse selection where only politically connected companies were confident of 
bidding and consequently Nigerian banks absorbed all the risk, as mentioned earlier. 
The above is in contrast with the successful privatisation of Nigeria’s telecom sector in 2001. 
This was one reason why investors and donors were keen to push privatisation of the 
electricity sector and with good reason. Telecommunications has been the sector driving 
growth in services and GDP, while the electricity sector has had little appreciable impact on 
the economy (Table 5). In fact, it would be safe to say the falling growth rates in the last two 
quarters are indicative of further stresses building up in the sector. 
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Table 5: Growth rates (%) of the electricity and telecom sector, 2018–2019 
Quarter/Year Q1 
2018 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Total Q1 
2019 
Q2 Q3 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
4.93 7.59 18.27 0.95 7.30 8.47 0.43 -11.81 
Telecommunications and 
information services 
1.88 11.54 14.97 16.67 11.33 12.18 11.34 12.16 
Source: NBS (2019: 94). 
The bidders in the telecom sector were also politically connected (Usman, 2019), yet the 
outcome of the reform process was very different from that in the electricity sector. From 
our analysis, a set of related reasons stand out as to why this may be. The first relates to the 
historical corruption referred to earlier with regard to the workings of the TCN and the deep-
seated technical inefficiencies this led to. The private players in the telecom sector did not 
have to deal with a pivotal but inefficient public-sector entity in order to become profitable. 
Instead, their profitability depended on the ability to invest in the network and scale up to 
decrease operating costs and increase average revenue per user. The technological intensity 
of the telecom sector is also higher than in the electricity sector (at least for generation). 
Telecom is an oligopolistic sector, and this makes the time horizon for learning and catching 
up relatively short as it has to contend with other large players. This creates compulsions to 
create rents in a productive manner through innovative technology or service provision as 
opposed to capturing rents (though the process of getting licences for spectrum might well 
be politically captured). In the electricity sector, which has more mature or standardised 
technology, innovation does not drive productivity growth in the same way and rents have 
to be captured by other means. In the distribution sector, most of the companies were 
monopolies as there was one company per region. The nature of the electricity value chain is 
also one that requires many discrete processes and firms, all of which have to function in 
step and seamlessly, beginning with the sourcing and pricing of gas at one end to metering 
of usage at the other. This is also unlike the telecom sector where the value chain is 
structured differently and firms usually own processes and assets in the value chain such as 
telecom towers.  
The configuration of organisational power that is relevant for understanding Nigeria’s 
electricity sector includes powerful but not technically capable private-sector organisations 
in generation and distribution. Institutions do not have linear effects – they are always 
interactive (Khan, 2010). An institution – in this case the set of privatisation reforms that 
worked in a different configuration of power (i.e. the telecom sector) – introduced in a 
political settlement where the likelihood of enforcement is low, will lead to adverse 
outcomes. In the Nigerian electricity sector, privatisation gave these organisations significant 
new rents that increased their already high relative power. On the other side were relatively 
weak and fragmented political and state organisations that had large rents to distribute from 
oil revenues, as well as a weak manufacturing sector and a politically weak retail consumer 
base. If reformers in Nigeria and the international financial institutions had understood the 
implications of privatising within this configuration of power, it may have given them pause 
for thought. In a context of weak adherence to a rule of law that is typical in developing 
countries, we should expect the powerful to attempt to distort formal institutions in ways 
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that give them additional rents. The relative power of other organisations tells us in what 
direction and how far they are likely to go. The question should have been whether, in the 
specific conditions of Nigeria, countervailing forces existed to check these attempts at 
informal rent capture (Roy, 2017). If not, a more gradual privatisation strategy should be 
followed, that only privatises parts of the chain where productive capabilities, competition 
or pressures from other constituencies could limit the informal rent capture. 
The dramatic increase in rent capture in the electricity sector after privatisation was a 
consequence of a significant change in types of informality. There was a reversal of patron–
client relationships as business ‘clients’ to politicians switched to become the dominant 
partner in rent-capture relationships, sometimes because erstwhile politicians became 
businessmen. Patron–client relationships operate on a spectrum and are indeed often 
reversible (Roy, 2013). This is because, unlike with well-defined formal rights, informal 
institutions are malleable. This is particularly the case when the bargaining power of some 
individuals or organisations is changed as a result of changes in formal institutions, for 
instance as a result of privatisation or primitive accumulation. Further changes in informal 
modifications that then follow can result in unexpected spikes in unproductive rent capture, 
as radically new types of informality emerge. In developing-country political settlements 
where a generalised rule of law is absent, dramatic reversals in patron–client relationships 
reflect changes in the relative power of politicians and businesses in informal networks. But 
these reversals do not necessarily result in an improvement in economic outcomes just 
because business becomes more dominant. The reverse may be the case, as in the Nigerian 
electricity sector. 
A consequence of such mechanisms can be exemplified in the operations of the major 
players in the grid. While some of the concerns, outlined earlier, raised by players about the 
privatisation process were genuine, the architects of the privatisation programme had at 
least tried to hand over the privatised assets with relative low liability. This was done 
through the Nigeria Electricity Liability Management Company (NELMCO), which was set up 
as a part of the privatisation process to take over legacy debts of the PHCN and had even 
taken over the pension liabilities of the old state owned-companies in the sector. While 
NELMCO has frequently run into controversy regarding settling pension claims, these were 
no longer the remit of the privatised entities in the electricity sector. With their books 
relatively clean, the GenCos and DisCos were expected to therefore start making 
investments to the existing infrastructure once they started making operating profits. 
However, they ended up paying themselves dividends and paying off their own bank loans 
that they used to purchase the companies and there was no compulsion from regulators to 
check this.  
A similar lack of oversight can be identified in the functioning of the DisCos. The government 
owns 40% in every DisCo, giving them enough stake to intervene in matters of compliance. 
But, so far, there have been little attempts to introduce checks and balances into a very 
critical link in the electricity supply system. This is significant as the DisCos are the only part 
of the grid with access to large sums of liquidity as they are responsible for collecting 
payments from customers. Active government oversight as a result of this stake could have 
helped ensure the DisCos were collecting payments from customers and remitting enough 
Breaking the cycle of corruption in Nigeria’s electricity sector: a political settlements analysis 
21 
payments to the rest of the grid, but this has not been forthcoming. The failure of 
government to effectively exercise its responsibility over DisCos has led to the Nigeria 
Senate requesting the government to sell its 40 percent stake to foreign investors though 
this is being resisted by the Discos. 
Both DisCos and GenCos often evacuate power, keeping in sight commercial considerations 
at the expense of equitable supply. For instance, DisCos often do not provide power to 
economically poorer areas in their region as they know collections from these areas will be 
low (or that they will find it relatively difficult to get their customers to pay) and prefer 
supplying power to areas with better-off customers who are more able to pay their bills. It 
does not help that that the amount DisCos charge (this is a percentage of the total retail 
tariff) is weighted according to the population density of the region it covers. This means 
that the charges are higher in areas that are less densely populated and resistance to paying 
bills is also higher. GenCos sometimes evacuate power to the grid even when there is not 
enough requirement so that they can bill this to NBET. These processes are distortionary but 
arise due to the uncertain and high-risk nature of the sector where players often have to 
resort to playing outside the rules in order to operate.  
The initial design for privatisation had also envisaged that DisCos would provide revolving 
bank guarantees to NBET to back their payments contracts. These were to be used in case 
they failed to pay their collections (from bill payments). In early 2015 the DisCos were 
settling close to 80% of the amount invoiced to them but these soon started dropping to 
their current lows (see Figure 3). Some say the initial high payments were due to the bank 
guarantees but as it became clear that these were not going to be called upon, there was 
little compulsion to maintain high levels of payments.  
Figure 3: Payments by DisCos to the sector 
 
Source: Association of Power Generation Companies, Nigeria (2019) (unpublished data) 
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There are some signs now that the sector is moving towards a period of consolidation as 
some GenCos are looking to buy DisCos. This may well be a future solution where GenCos 
move towards becoming mini utilities with their own sub-feeders connected to the 
transmission network and this consolidation may provide the incentive structure for rule-
following behaviour (economies of scale could provide higher revenue). However, given the 
constraints in other parts of the grid, for now the incentive to buy a DisCo still primarily 
remains the fact that they are the only entities that bring in ready liquidity to their 
operations. The government is unlikely to take any decision on sectoral restructuring that 
disturbs current ownership patterns given the high levels of political connectedness in the 
sector. This therefore makes the sector politically ‘too big to fail’ where, for now, saving it 
might mean maintaining the status quo.  
Figure 4 summarises the distortions in the sector and the underlying drivers of these.  
Figure 4: Sectoral map of distortions 
 
Source: Authors 
Note: The blue arrow denotes payments made up the chain. 
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4. Escalating economic and social 
costs 
The confluence of factors described in previous sections has led to mounting costs for the 
Nigerian economy with potentially damaging implications for productivity and employment 
growth. The direct costs to the exchequer are also consequential and are the result of 
accruing losses in the electricity sector. The country lost N11 trillion through corruption-
related practices in the electricity sector from 1999 to 2017 (SERAP, 2017). Monthly losses in 
the sector, or the shortfall between income and costs, is N40 billion and accrues mainly due 
to four factors – low generation, low billing collections, skewed tariffs and forex valuations 
(SDN, 2018). The first two are obvious enough. In terms of the third factor, tariffs are 
skewed because states with a more reliable customer base have lower tariffs, and those that 
have fewer customers have a higher tariff burden. Hence, in states where tariffs could be 
higher due to higher potential to pay as a result of greater industrial or commercial activity 
(like Ikeja or Abuja), the tariffs are lower. And states that could benefit from lower tariffs 
end up with higher tariffs, lower usage and low revenue (ibid.). Interestingly, NERC 
mandates that government-owned agencies in the sector like TCN and NBET should be paid 
100% of sectoral revenues before any other dues are settled, which leaves the private sector 
even more cash-strapped (Ade, 2019).  
The fourth factor that leads to the shortfall is the assumption of the Naira’s (N) exchange 
rate with the dollar. A significant portion of the industry’s costs is indexed to the US dollar. 
But this value remains pegged to the value of the dollar in 2012 and the current value of the 
Naira is lower. The NERC is well aware of the situation as it highlights the commercial 
viability of the sector as a ‘major challenge’ in its report for the second quarter of 2019 
(NERC, 2019: 10). The report goes on to highlight that of every N10 worth of energy sold, 
N3.09 remained as dues and uncollected (ibid.). For a detailed discussion of technical losses 
in the distribution sector and regulatory architecture see Adeniyi (2019). 
Figure 5: Shortfall between what DisCos pay and what they owe in Q2 2019 
 
Source: NERC (2019: 40, Figure 9).  
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We can now start to identify how processes were not in lockstep from the start of 
privatisation.  
One issue is the contractual mechanism for gas supplies. And supply is often disrupted due 
to vandalism of gas pipelines (SDN, 2018). The gas companies who supply the GenCos have 
to fulfil a domestic supply obligation in order to export as electricity is a priority sector, but 
domestic prices are lower than export prices. Hence, these companies have little incentive 
to supply higher amounts to GenCos, who are also unable to pay for the gas that they 
receive. This is despite the creation of the government-owned Gas Aggregation Company of 
Nigeria which is supposed to be the intermediary between gas production companies and 
GenCos. A related area of concern is that the Payment Assurance Guarantee (PAG) by the 
FGN runs out in April this year and GenCos will find it even more difficult to meet their gas 
procurement payments.  
Further to this, the payment mechanism is such that DisCos are supposed to collect 
payments for the entire sector and then pass them back up the chain to the various 
components (SDN, 2018). This mechanism is a key reason for the underperformance of the 
sector. As GenCos do not have policy certainty, they often demand less gas and produce less 
electricity. For instance, GenCos have a performance target but this is not streamlined with 
the DisCos’ performance targets (ibid.). As a result, the GenCos are producing electricity sub-
optimally, which is exacerbated by the lack of transmission capacity in the system. In turn, 
DisCos have less power to evacuate to end consumers and cannot increase tariffs in a 
scenario where consumers do not have enough power. In fact, the TCN often despatches 
higher electricity than what DisCos end up distributing, and this is because the DisCos want 
to reduce their losses (Adeniyi, 2019).  
The tariffs, called Multi-Year Tariff Orders, were set according to assumptions based on 
exchange rates, inflation, cost of capital, expansion of generation and transmission networks 
etc. So far none of these have held out and the values of each have moved in a way that has 
made tariffs more expensive than they are currently (Gershon and Ezurum, 2017). This 
means the sector goes into deeper loss for every unit of electricity generated.  
This is not to say that the electricity sector in most developing countries is profitable with 
the market reflective of cost structures. On the contrary, most are loss-making and heavily 
subsidised as the determination of a tariff is usually a political decision. While industrial and 
urban sectors can subsidise agricultural or rural sectors, for instance, only some countries 
have the fiscal space to accommodate these subsidies while also possessing higher-quality 
assets in the sector. Given the magnitude of the growing debt, this is not the case in Nigeria. 
In fact, many of the DisCos in Nigeria are technically bankrupt and, since they are responsible 
for payments further up the chain, the sector is cash-strapped as a whole. This has led to a 
financing model such that the losses of existing players are not covered, and the legacy debt 
overhang will not attract fresh investors. The under-payment of invoices by DisCos is also 
leading to accumulation of debt. Assets in the sector are now in danger of being termed 
‘stranded’ – that is, their investment costs cannot be recovered. Subsequently, the DisCos 
resorted to the practice of ‘estimated billing’ (described earlier) to recoup some of the losses. 
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In the absence of meters, many customers were presented with bills that were supposed to be 
estimates of their electricity consumption and there were reports of significant overcharging. 
However, in their defence, DisCos have said that some of their biggest debtors are 
government ministries and agencies (Peng and Poudineh, 2017). DisCos have been reluctant to 
install smart meters, but thanks to a push by NERC, the number of metered connections is 
slowly increasing. Additionally, there has been a move by Nigerian legislators to criminalise 
estimated billing but, given that DisCos have genuine technical constraints too, it is likely that 
such legislation will only compound their operational problems.  
The NERC has however recently relaxed its methodology for charging estimated billings as 
well as cancelled estimated billings for unmetered customers. This will hopefully act as a 
catalyst for installation of meters. The NERC has also announced a hike in electricity tariffs 
from April this year. Much will depend on the ability to implement the hike in the face of 
resistance from retail consumers. A policy called Meter Asset Provider has also been 
announced to facilitate suppliers of meters to customers but a recent 35 percent hike on 
imported meters, ostensibly to help domestic manufacturers, has led to uncertainty around 
consistent supply of meters. 
Figure 6: Percentage of metered customers 
 
Source: NERC (2019: 16, Figure C).  
The FGN has meanwhile spent considerable amounts on the sector. The N701 billion PAG is 
a recent intervention by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Other CBN interventions are the 
N300 billion Power and Aviation Intervention Facility (PAIF) and the N213 billion Nigeria 
Electricity Market Stabilisation Facility (NEMSF). The new budget has also announced 
support of N59.44 billion for the NBET. An issue of recent contention is the partial risk 
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guarantees (PRGs) that the FGN has provided to two entities linked to power projects, Azura 
and Accugas. Azura is a private power producer, while Accugas is a private gas supplier. PRGs 
are sanctioned by the World Bank and disbursed to applying countries to provide a credible 
commitment mechanism for the private sector in situations where confidence to invest 
might be low and the perception of political risk is high. In the case of Azura, the FGN is 
committed to paying the company between $30 million to $33 million a month for power 
generated, even if it cannot be despatched due to inefficiencies in the transmission system 
referred to earlier. In the case of Accugas, the gas supply deal to the government-owned 
Calabar Electricity Generation Company has actually not materialised but because of the 
specific terms of the contract the FGN is still having to pay Accugas close to $10 million every 
month (Adebulu, 2019). The fear is if the FGN is unable to keep making these payments, the 
risk of default on the PRGs – which is essentially a loan – rises. Officials have started 
questioning why these guarantees were provided at a time when the country’s transmission 
infrastructure is inadequate. However, it also needs to be noted that Azura had a first 
mover’s advantage and this is a learning process for the FGN. It also demonstrates that given 
watertight contracts, private financing is possible in the sector.  
Despite these significant outlays, 55% of the population had no access to the grid in 2015 
(Advisory Power Team, 2015) and not much has changed since then. The ‘tapping’ of 
distribution lines – where electricity is drawn illegally – is a common practice across 
developing countries, including in Nigeria. Both consumers and employees of distribution 
companies are complicit in this theft. Common too is the use of generators and illegal 
markets for fuel. A recent article in Nature Sustainability calculates the ‘mean net cost of 
electricity’ from diesel generators in Nigeria at $1.6 billion per year (Farquharson et al., 
2018). The fuel for these generators is often bought on the black market, especially during 
fuel shortages. Diesel is the most produced item in illegal artisanal mining refineries in the 
Niger Delta and it finds its way into the black market for generator fuel, adding to the 
heightened insecurity in the region (SDN, 2018). Once the environmental and security 
impact of diesel generators is considered too, the full social costs are much higher. For a 
detailed study on pollution-related effects of self-generation via generators in low- and 
middle-income countries, see IFC (2019). The report also refers to a study by Eloise and 
Weidinmyer (2016) on combustion emissions in Africa, where generators for back up 
production are a key source of dangerous ozone formation in the lower atmosphere, 
particularly in Nigeria. 
Some recent estimates suggest that Nigeria needs between 30 gigawatts (GW) to 175 GW of 
electricity at a cost of $40 billion to $200 billion (Adugbo, 2019). Given the increasing losses 
and the growing risk premium in the sector, these gaps are likely to remain unmet in the 
medium term. In 2008, the Nigerian Energy Commission estimated that Nigerians spent 
$975 million on alternative sources of energy (PwC, 2012) and this number will have only 
gone up as demand has grown and the economy has become more complex.  
4.1. The impact on (M)SMEs in particular 
Arguably the segment of the economy most disadvantaged by this mismatch between 
supply and demand for power is the Nigerian micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) 
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sector. According to a PwC (2016) report, MSMEs account for 96% of all businesses in the 
country. A survey of the sector by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2013: Table 38) 
estimated that in 2013 MSMEs contributed to almost 97% of the agriculture sector’s input to 
GDP and 55.53% for manufacturing. However, close to a majority of them received between 
just one and five hours a day of electricity (ibid: Table 35). The same survey highlighted that 
access to power was one of the three key constraints to growth identified by MSMEs. A 
study by Urbanisation Research Nigeria (Bloch et al., 2015) also reported power as the most 
important constraints for manufacturing clusters in urban areas. Much of the relevant 
literature on MSMEs evidences a consensus on lack of power as a key reason for high 
operating costs among such firms (Adenikinju, 2005; Arnold et al., 2006; Escribano et al., 
2009; Moyo, 2012; Scott et al., 2014; Bloch et al., 2015).  
While residential and commercial consumers also suffer, most residential users and at least 
some commercial customers are able to use alternative sources (to grid-based electricity), 
like generators and battery packs to fulfil their demand. Residential and commercial users 
should also be encouraged to adopt renewable energy, and the FGN has been at the 
forefront of that. Of late, off-grid solar power is also being used successfully by such 
consumers in Nigeria, for instance to power Ariaria market in Abia state or Sabon Gari in 
Kano. For an excellent overview of the effects of electricity supply constraints on SME 
productivity in six developing countries including Nigeria, see Scott et al. (2015), and 
specifically for Nigeria, see Adenikinju (2005). 
Such alternative sources are, as yet, inadequate to meet the demand of SMEs, however, 
especially in the manufacturing sector where firms require what is called ‘motive power’ to 
operate machinery. This has implications for economy-wide productivity growth as well as 
job creation. Workers in the MSME sector made up 84.02% of the country’s labour force in 
2013. Manufacturing businesses in the SME sector employed 27.72% of the entire 
workforce, the highest share of any sub-sector (NBS, 2013: Table 26). In terms of ownership, 
in the same year, female entrepreneurs accounted for 43.32% of micro enterprises and 
23.75% of SMEs. Youth ownership was also very high in this segment in 2012 (NBS, 2013). 
Both of these are important demographics in terms of inclusive and broad-based growth and 
lack of electricity is bound to affect these developmental outcomes.  
The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey (2014b) reported that 70% of firms owned a generator 
at the time of the survey. This has financial consequences, with significant negative effects 
on cost-competitiveness and productive growth, as the firms reported that electrical outages 
cost them 15.6% of annual sales. Our own research conducted in existing SME clusters in the 
FCT, Aba in Abia state, Nnewi and Onitsha in Anambra backs these findings (see Section 5). 
The last three are well-known manufacturing clusters in Nigeria in leather products and 
clothing, auto parts and polythene, respectively. The clusters have already well-developed 
linkages with local markets for both inputs and outputs (Bloch et al., 2015), as well as 
informal, private mechanisms for dealing with market failures like access to water, 
inadequate road connectivity and even power supply (more on which is detailed later). 
Manufacturing firms also make up close to 30% of businesses in Onitsha and Aba, making 
these clusters a relevant choice for the research (ibid.).  
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A comparison of data from 2007 and 2014 reveals that the number of SMEs grew 
significantly in this period and that more firms were exporting (Igwe et al., 2018). Yet the 
industrial sector’s contribution to GDP has remained mostly static (NBS, 2019). The 
manufacturing growth rate was in negative territory in the second quarter of 2019 (-0.13%) 
and has only recovered in the third quarter (1.1%). But this is still lower than the growth rate 
the sector achieved in Q1 2018 of 3.39%. As outlined earlier, lack of adequate electricity 
supply is a key contributor to why the SME sector lags in contributing to GDP growth. Given 
our analysis of the intractable corruption in the electricity value chain and the damage that 
this could potentially inflict on the SME sector, we decided to focus on feasible strategies 
that would increase supply to this sector in particular. Our results are outlined in the next 
section. 
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5. Evidence to support the proposed 
ACE strategy  
The analysis in the preceding sections points us to a two-pronged approach we think would 
work optimally for the electricity sector. The first requires a short-to-medium-term strategy 
that would help ease power constraints in established SME clusters. The second is a longer-
term strategy that has to include capital infusion to overhaul the efficiency parameters of 
the grid from gas supply to distribution as well as debt restructuring to improve the liquidity 
situation in the sector. This will allow players to continue operations and take a long-term 
investment view. This could range from write-offs or bond issuances (that were once 
announced but later shelved) to cover the legacy debt.  
Our anti-corruption strategy is a bottom-up approach to identify feasible and implementable 
solutions that work within the constraints of the specific distribution of power (Khan et al., 
2019). The characteristics of corruption in the Nigerian power sector are such that the sector 
has been pushed to a financially unsustainable position. The interests of government-owned 
agencies in the sector for a big-bang restructuring solution is as yet questionable. Donors 
have no doubt set out ambitious plans, but these are long-term in nature. 
Our policy solution addresses the short-to-medium-term time horizon and has two aspects. 
The first is easing supply constraints for existing SME clusters and the second is to provide 
off-grid solutions for them. The World Bank has plans for a programme to finance mini grids 
for hospitals and universities, and commercial markets like Ariaria in Aba are already 
connected via mini grids. However, no policy exists for established SME clusters. We firmly 
believe that generation and transmission through the grid must remain a key policy target, 
but a grid-based solution will not have a turnaround time short enough for SMEs.  
Not surprisingly, our focus groups discussions (FGDs) and interviews identified high demand 
for electricity in the SME hubs of Nnewi, Onitsha and Aba, and also in the FCT. However, on 
average, most of the SMEs in the FCT area received more electricity from the grid than those 
in the South East and, hence, for the second round of interviews we decided to focus on the 
South East. Two factors helped us to narrow down our choice. Firstly, SMEs in the South 
Eastern clusters were already sourcing power through ‘informally formal’ mechanisms like 
‘pay-as-you-go electricity’. These are entrepreneurs who invest in large generators to supply 
electricity to SME units located in a close radius. And secondly, almost 100% of South 
Eastern respondents reported they had cut down on production due to power shortages. 
One large SME involved in aluminium fabrication had even outsourced production to nearby 
Asaba, the capital city of Delta state in the South South region; a large shoemaker who used 
to export to Togo and Ghana cannot anymore because of electricity-related production 
constraints; and in South Aba, a large education service provider and exam centre had no 
grid connectivity at all and depended entirely on generators. However, almost all of the 
SMEs we interviewed in the FCT reported that they would increase production if they had 
more power. One of the reasons for this is that the FCT is an emerging SME hub, while the 
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South East is an established one and the risk of deindustrialisation is therefore greater in 
that region. 
These two factors were also key in helping us determine the choice of the anti-corruption 
strategy cluster for the sector – namely, aligning incentives (Khan et al., 2019). The crux of 
the ACE framework is to identify a sectoral, incremental and bottom-up strategy that is likely 
to have localised support. First, the SMEs in our clusters were facing severe production 
constraints and the lack of adequate electricity supply was one key reason for this. Second, 
they had also already devised collective mechanisms to address the problem. While the 
mechanism of pay-as-you-go power is obviously inadequate, it does evidence support for a 
collectivised solution for power supply among a broadly powerful community who can be 
mobilised in their self-interest to support alternative policies. The business owners in our 
sample, who can be considered representative, have an average of 13.4 years of experience 
running their operations – this means that they have significant stakes in keeping their 
businesses running productively and they are also powerful enough as a collective. 
The SMEs in the three locations are already clustered into plastics and polythene-making 
and metal fabrication (Onitsha), shoe-making and tailoring (Aba), and auto part-making 
(Nnewi). The firms are a mix of formal and informal, and the clusters number between over 
85 firms (directly in manufacturing) and 10,000 (indirectly through allied services) in the case 
of Nnewi and 7,000 in the case of the footwear cluster in Aba (Nwosu, 2017). The leather 
clusters in Abia state have long been considered productive with historically well-developed 
inter-firm organisational networks (see Meagher, 2006 for more) and are also export 
competitive. They also have a strong local market. The polymer and polythene cluster is an 
emerging one and has the advantage of having access to petro-chemical plants nearby for 
raw materials. The Nnewi cluster is the most developed (Nwosu, 2017). The advantage of a 
power generation and distribution strategy targeting existing and productive clusters such as 
these is that sustained demand for electricity is already likely to exist. 
Anti-corruption measures will only be feasible if the suggested policy succeeds in aligning 
the interests of a sufficient number of powerful and productive organisations to support the 
enforcement of rules that enable developmental outcomes. Secondary research has 
revealed that conditions exist to support our suggested measure. A key component of our 
research was also primary research, based on a series of FGDs and key informant interviews 
to ascertain the levels of support for a disaggregated generation strategy that would supply 
power only to nearby clusters. Box 1 outlines the profiles of SMEs that took part in the FGDs. 
Our findings are encouraging in that all of our respondents reported they would support 
such a system. Box 2 further outlines some of the major cross-cutting findings from our 
FGDs, including a very positive response to our strategy suggestion of disaggregated 
generation. 
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Box 1: Business profiles of round-one FGD participants 
Thirty individuals participated in the first three FGDs organised in May 2018 with Aba and 
Nnewi/Onitsha business communities (10 participants per FGD). The profile and nature of 
the participants’ businesses consisted of the following:   
1 Computer, graphics and printing companies (computer-based test (CBT) centres)  
2 Shoe manufacturers  
3 Fabricators (welding technicians)  
4 Plastic and polythene manufacturers  
5 Tailors, cold rooms and ice-block producers  
6 Alumaco constructors (aluminium designers)  
7 Engine block reborers  
8 Laundry services  
9 Wood/furniture designers  
Box 2: Key cross-cutting findings from FGDs 
1 There was a general consensus among FGD participants that the privatisation of NEPA 
into PHCN and the Enugu Electricity Distribution Company (EEDC) as part of PHCN has 
been in name only. The view from the business community is that there has not been 
any positive or visible change in terms of improvement in power supply since the 
privatisation in 2013. For instance, the power supply from PHCN in Aba, Nnewi and 
Onitsha has remained the same since privatisation. The only thing that has changed 
that participants felt strongly about is the continuous increase in tariffs and the 
significant decrease in power supply. 
2 All the businesses in Aba, Nnewi and Onitsha depend on high consumption and stable 
electricity consumption for operations. Power supply is the single most expensive item 
in the production process. On average, power supply constitutes 35% of the cost of 
production of manufacturers.  
3 There is enthusiasm for an embedded, disaggregated power supply but participants 
were clear that they wouldn’t pay more than what they currently pay (to EEDC and for 
generator maintenance and diesel supplies) even if it meant consistent supply. 
We decided to extend our research  based on the third finding in Box 2 to compare current 
costs for SMEs with what costs ought to be with grid-based electricity, as well as 
extrapolating costs by combining various scenarios of electricity usage (i.e., grid-based, legal 
and illegal, for instance through tapping and legal and black market diesel for generators). 
For the second round of research we set up interviews with 32 SME owners, as we were 
probing not just costs but also how the entrepreneurs sourced electricity (which typically 
also included informal means). Almost all of them provided answers to the three key 
financial questions for our extrapolation exercise: 1) monthly expenditure on their electricity 
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bill from the power company, 2) monthly expenditure on diesel for their generator and 3) 
the amount spent every month on maintaining their generator.  
As was expected, we did not get any responses when we asked participants about accessing 
electricity by tapping distribution lines. As mentioned earlier, this is a practice where even 
the EEDC is complicit. However, our only aim in this line of questioning was to compute the 
cost of sourcing power without which our extrapolation would not work. The aim was 
certainly not to ‘name and shame’ because we well understand the constraints many of 
these SME owners face in keeping their production lines working – electricity shortages 
being one of the key challenges. In fact, this is an excellent example of how the ACE 
framework operates. Enforcement-related policies that involve naming and shaming in 
communities like these are unlikely to work as they will be viewed as adversarial to their 
interests. Indeed, nor will a ‘whistleblower’ policy work as most SME owners are likely to 
have accessed electricity informally to keep operating their machines. This is especially true 
when a solution – consistent supply of power – is not being provided. However, a solution is 
much more likely to work if power can be supplied through formal means at competitive 
tariffs (compared to what firms pay now), given that the incentives to tap or to source diesel 
on the black market will be weaker. Corruption here is the result of a market failure. Until 
that is addressed, enforcement is highly unlikely to work. 
Table A1 in the annex presents selected characteristics of the sampled SMEs, including: 
nature of business, number of employees in each factory, number of years each factory has 
been in operation, estimated weekly sales (revenue), capacity of generator, and number of 
hours in a week the factories operate. The nature of business is entrepreneurship and 
includes activities such as shoemaking, metal fabrication, canopy fabrication, tailoring, 
printing, etc. The size of the factories in terms of number of employees ranges from those 
without fixed employees (people employed as the need arises) to factories with 20 
employees. These factories have been in operation for between 3 years and 30 years. The 
weekly sales reported by the factories ranges from N22,700 to N2,100,000. However, some 
factories did not disclose their weekly sales due to reasons of confidentiality. The capacity of 
generators used by the factories depends on the size and nature of the business. The 
operating hours in a week range from 45 hours to 144 hours.  
Figure 7 below shows total weekly sales revenue and total outlay on electricity reported by 
the sampled SMEs. The maximum revenue reported was N2,100,000 and the lowest total 
weekly sales was N30,000. Total outlay on electricity varies from N14,500 to N516,600. As is 
expected, firms with higher sales have higher electricity consumption with a few outliers. 
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Figure 7: Total weekly sales and total outlay on electricity 
 
Source: The authors. 
Figure 8 below shows the monthly expenditure on diesel and the monthly electricity bill 
provided by EEDC. The highest expenditure on diesel reported was N441,000, while the 
highest monthly expenditure on electricity provided by EEDC was N50,000. For most firms, 
power purchases and diesel purchases appear to be correlated because of differences in the 
activities of firms (some are more power hungry). This is striking as most firms are buying 
just a little more diesel than they are from EEDC. Even small differences in the share of diesel 
in the mix raises costs as we see in the last figure in this series (Figure 9), implying diesel-
based generation is expensive and inefficient, even allowing for poor supply from the grid.  
Figure 8: Monthly expenditure on diesel versus EEDC electricity bill  
 
Source: The authors. 
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Figure 9 below shows monthly expenditure on diesel and generator maintenance. The 
highest expenditure on diesel was N441,000 while generator maintenance was N30,800. 
Generator maintenance is often not computed as a cost but, as we see from this graph, it is 
significant. The IFC report on backup generation referred to earlier conservatively estimates 
O&M costs to be 10% to 20% of fuel costs, and that is significant (IFC, 2019). 
Spending on alternative costs is high not just because of diesel but also because of poor-
quality generators. So small firms could have high unit costs of power not because they are 
buying more diesel, but because they have poor-quality generators which need high spend 
on maintenance.  
Figure 9: Expenditure on diesel and generator maintenance 
 
Source: The authors. 
In Figure 10 below we consider large firms with sales above N100,000 and with observations 
for all variables. On the vertical axis (Y-axis), we compute the ratio of power outlay on 
weekly sales. Power outlay comprises all expenditures related to non-grid power such as 
weekly expenditures on the following: diesel, generator purchase and maintenance. And 
grid expenditure denotes weekly expenditure on EEDC (electricity bill). The ratio of non-grid 
power outlay on sales adjusts for the size of the factories and gives us an idea of the cost-to-
revenue ratio for each factory. On the X-axis we compute the ratio of grid on non-grid 
outlay. This ratio captures the extent to which the factories rely on power from the grid 
relative to alternative sources (e.g. diesel). A ratio above one means that the factories spend 
more on EEDC compared to other sources of power and vice versa.  
The scatter plot shows an inverse (negative) relationship between the ratio of outlay over 
sales, and the ratio of grid over outlay. This pattern of relationship implies that, as the ratio 
of outlay/sales rises, the ratio of grid/outlay declines and vice versa. Except for a few 
outliers, the rest of the factories show that an increase in expenditure on grid supply over 
outlay will result in a decline in the ratio of outlay over sales. In other words, an increase in 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
450000
500000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
G
e
n
e
ra
to
r 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 (
n
ai
ra
) 
 E
xp
e
n
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 d
ie
se
l (
n
ai
ra
) 
Factory unit number 
Monthly expenditure on diesel Monthly expenditure on generator maintenance
Breaking the cycle of corruption in Nigeria’s electricity sector: a political settlements analysis 
35 
the use of EEDC (holding other variables constant) will result in a decline in expenditure on 
cost of power as a share of outlay. Or as expenditure on EEDC increases, less will be 
committed to expenditure on outlays (e.g. diesel, generators and maintenance). It means 
that relying on diesel is very expensive and substituting diesel with poor-quality grid supply, 
even a little bit (everyone uses a bit of both), results in lower total expenditure on power as 
a percentage of sales.  
Figure 10: Relationship between the ratio of outlay over sales, and the ratio of grid over 
outlay 
 
Source: The Authors. 
Our respondents were clear that they would support a disaggregated generation and supply 
mechanism if the costs were lower than what they currently face. This finding can be further 
strengthened as the policy space encouraging such moves has now opened up. In 2012, the 
FGN announced policies that made it possible to create independent distribution networks 
(NERC, 2012). A more recent policy announcement was made in 2017 for ‘eligible customers’ 
that has further helped in devising such solutions (Clyde&Co, 2018). This allows consumers 
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range between what the distribution company currently charges and what the SME owners 
currently spend on electricity, including on self-generation. This is also the range within 
which they will be willing to pay and not need to access electricity informally, thus ensuring 
that a disaggregated, off-grid policy will be self-enforcing (horizontal enforcement) and 
therefore self-sustaining. 
Box 3: Key cross-cutting findings from FGDs 
An entrepreneur in the IT education sector in Aba South who isn’t supplied by the grid 
 Total monthly costs currently, including for diesel and an engineer for his diesel 
generator: N1,205,000  
 Total monthly consumption based on consumption of 32KW for 22 hours every day in  
a month (during peak periods where he conducts examinations for the government): 
19,712 kWh (The entrepreneur is a training provider for exam preparation and this  
figure is for when there is peak demand for his services) 
 Total unit costs currently: N 61.13 kWh 
 Current average unit cost on grid with EEDC (if he had been connected): N31.51 kWh  
 Any figure between N61.13 and N31.51 will be developmental for this entrepreneur 
A polythene manufacturer in the Onitsha cluster 
 Total monthly costs currently, including payments to the distribution company, diesel  
for his generator and operations and maintenance (O&M) for the generator: N500,000 
 Total monthly consumption based on consumption of 35KW for 16 hours daily and five 
days a week: 11,200 kWh  
 Total unit costs currently: N44.64 kWh 
 Current average unit cost on grid with EEDC: N31.51 kWh (Gershon and Ezurum, 2017) 
 Any figure between N44.64 and N31.51 will be developmental for this entrepreneur 
Source: The authors. 
Though not for supply to clusters, it is possible to see details of the growing numbers of 
applications for similar, smaller projects in NERC quarterly reports. However, as experts have 
pointed out, this could be detrimental to the DisCos. It is important to see that their 
interests are balanced via compensation like the competition transaction charge being 
considered by NERC or through wheeling charges when electricity passes through their 
network from the licensed generator to eligible customers. 
5.1. Mind the local political economy 
In this research our evidence has established the cost advantage of a grid-based, non-diesel 
generator-related policy option, as well as qualitatively establishing the willingness to pay on 
the part of SME owners. However, a complementary line of questioning also offers a 
cautionary nudge in terms of the non-technocratic issues that need to be kept in mind.  
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The political settlements framework can be used to analyse the implications of the 
configuration of power at two levels. One is to describe the broader social order and the 
other is to analyse the configuration of power relevant for the enforcement of a particular 
institution or policy (Khan, 2010). As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons why a 
disaggregated generation and distribution policy might work in well-established SME 
clusters is because they have well-developed intra- and inter-organisational capabilities. 
However, these might be the very reasons why local power structures need to better 
studied. The region has a complex and contested history, Aba being the city where the 
vigilante group Baksassi Boys emerged, first as an anti-establishment grouping (among shoe 
producers) which was then co-opted by the political establishment (Meagher, 2006).  
The Bakassi-related violence is now well past and some of the early members of the group 
are successful entrepreneurs today. But suspicion of the formal establishment exists 
alongside the demand for better formal infrastructure, like electricity supply. In fact, a few of 
our respondents flatly refused an invitation to travel to Abuja citing that the city and its 
institutions have seldom been of help to them. Instead, they depend almost solely on their 
local networks. Therefore, there are significant local informal institutional arrangements that 
exist and any localised policy, as supplying to clusters will be, needs to be cognizant of these.  
While highlighting the need for sensitivity in making policy recommendations for this 
segment of SMEs, the above situation also makes clear the need for context-specific policy 
that can help win back some trust. Local unions and trade associations are also important 
players in this context. Our research suggests mistrust between customers and electricity 
suppliers is high in some potentially productive areas like in the ones we surveyed. This 
points towards deploying a more consultative process than one which is purely top-down.  
It is also telling that private players such as those we spoke to in the financing sector were 
wary of committing to projects like this, despite the demand. Interviewees felt the risk-
return profile was not favourable for them, precisely because of the local political economy 
issues and the high transaction costs of resolving them. Hence the difficult but necessary 
task of creating an ‘institutional backstop’ that can be a bridge between these different 
stakeholders. This would be required whether the context is the South East or other 
locations in Nigeria where clusters exist like in Suleja, Kano or Ilorin. Credible commitment 
mechanisms need to exist not just in the form of contracts, but perhaps, like a few of our 
respondents suggested, also through piloting procedures like bill payment that is 
transparent and builds trust. This could have a strong demonstration effect and help uptake. 
Once there is uptake of this sort among critical stakeholders – or to use terminology from 
outcome mapping, the ‘boundary partners’ – policy is likely to be self-sustaining and, hence, 
enforceable. By definition, enforcement improves, and outcomes have the potential to be 
developmental as consistent power helps to improve productivity.  
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6. Conclusion 
The privatisation experience in the Nigerian electricity sector did not go as planned. Most 
analyses have identified problems of liquidity and technical inefficiencies. However, solving 
the liquidity crisis needs a longer-term horizon and strategy – it requires capital infusion to 
overhaul the efficiency of the grid from gas supply through to distribution, as well as debt 
restructuring to improve liquidity and enable a long-term investment view. Small sums of 
money will not lead to much impact. Nor will draconian measures like banning the 
importation of generators, as suggested by a Nigerian lawmaker, solve the crisis on the grid. 
If anything it will exacerbate the crisis in the sector. 
Given our analysis of the configuration of power in the electricity sector, a short-to-medium-
term strategy of devising disaggregated generation and distribution solutions for existing, 
productive SME clusters has more potential to succeed and to deliver high impact. A strategy 
of realigning incentives in a way that makes enforcement self-sustaining will help to reduce 
corruption in the sector and, by definition, will improve developmental outcomes. 
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7. Annex 
Table A1: Characteristics of the sampled SMEs 
S/No. Nature of business No. of 
employees 
Years in 
business 
Estimated 
weekly sales  
(N) 
Capacity of 
generator(s) 
  
Total no. of 
hours of EEDC 
electricity  
Total weekly 
work hours  
1 Shoemaking 6 19 2,000,000 12 KVA 8 78 
2 Shoe machines & shoes 20 33 1,000,000 12.5 KVA 7 60 
3 Computer-based test centre 20 3 2,100,000 60 KVA None 84 
4 Printing 8 8 150,000 11.15 KVA 5 66 
5 Metal fabrication 4 4 150,000 10 KVA None 45 
6 Graphic design, printing & 
computer training 
8 8 480,000 11.15 KVA 1 72 
7 Metal fabrication Hires as 
needed  
30 Undisclosed 9.9 KVA None 66 
8 Tailoring 5 9 70,000 30 KVA 1.5 78 
9 Cold room 3 12 Undisclosed  50 KVA 6 84 
10 Ice block 2 11 30,000 30 KVA 4 78 
11 Industrial shoe services 10 4 70,000 15 KVA 7 66 
12 Cold room 5 12 75,000 50 KVA 18 84 
13 Tailoring 3 11 36,000 Undisclosed 4 84 
14 Barber saloon 2 25 22,700 Undisclosed 0.5 75 
15 Tailoring (suits-making) 7 15 42,000 Undisclosed 1 63 
16 Tailoring (shirts) 2 7 60,000 Undisclosed  72 
17 Lithography & printing 10 25 70,000 10 KVA 4 66 
18 Aluminum window 
fabrication 
2 3 30,000 0.9 KVA Undisclosed 60 
19 Oil processing fabrication 1 15 360,000 20 KVA Undisclosed 72 
20 Corn grinding bucket 
fabrication 
4 20 200,000 7 KVA Undisclosed 54 
21 Canopy fabrication 2 5 450,000 20 KVA Undisclosed 72 
22 Canopy fabrication 7 6 200,000 30 KVA Undisclosed 66 
23 Unisex tailoring 4 6 351,000 11 KVA Undisclosed 84 
24 Male tailoring 5 4 90,000 3.7 KVA  Undisclosed 69 
25 Female tailoring 2 15 54,000 3.7 KVA Undisclosed 66 
26 Male tailoring  4 6 37,500 3.7 KVA  Undisclosed 57 
27 Male tailoring 15 10 300,000 3.7 KVA  Undisclosed 81 
28 Military/paramilitary 
outfitter 
3 30 Undisclosed 10 KVA  Undisclosed 66 
29 Female shoemaking 3 30 300,000 3. 75 KVA Undisclosed 60 
30 Male shoemaking 3 11 200,000 3.75 KVA Undisclosed 78 
31 Female shoemaking 3 27 500,000 3.75 KVA Undisclosed 144 
32 Male shoemaking 4 6 105,000 0.4 KVA Undisclosed 60 
Note: KVA = kilo-volt-amperes. 
Source: The authors. 
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